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The goal of corporate spin-offs, as a corporate restructuring technique, is to create better value for both the 
divesting firm and its subsidiary/ division. These corporate transactions lead to the creation of independent, 
publicly traded entities, which are called spun-off subsidiaries. In this study, we examine the effect of board 
independence and directors’ industry experience on the market performance of spun-off subsidiaries by setting 
two main hypotheses. Our sample includes 123 completed U.S.-based spin-off events during a 14-year long time 
frame. According to our empirical analysis, we find support for both hypotheses, which appear to be significant 
and positive. In addition, our moderation analysis shows that the interaction effect of directors’ industry 
experience and board ownership is positive and significant. Based on the arguments of agency and resource 
dependence theories, this study contributes to the governance literature by proving the significant importance 
of board of directors (namely, their independence and industry experience) on the market performance of 
spun-off subsidiaries after being separated from their corporate parents. From the managerial contributions 
aspect, this study tells us that if the board is independent and includes directors with the same industry 
experience, these spun-off subsidiaries will experience positive change in their market performance. Our 
interaction effect also shows that if board members are offered more shares on the top of their industry 
experience, the change in market performance will be stronger. 
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In the strategy field, there is a large literature on corporate divestitures (Cho and Cohen, 1997; 
Hoskisson, Johnson, and Moesel, 1994; Lee and Madhavan, 2010; Montgomery, Thomas, and Kamath, 
1984; Prezas and Simonyan, 2015). In the recent couple decades, one of the most “preferred” 
divestiture techniques has become corporate spin-offs. This technique is unique in the sense that 
without generating any cash (Bennett and Feldman, 2017), it aims to create better shareholder value 
(Chai, Lin, and Veld, 2018) for both the divesting firm (a.k.a. parent firm) and its spun-off subsidiary/ 
division (a.k.a. child firm). Boreiko and Murgia (2010) define this corporate transaction as follows: “A 
spin-off is a pro-rata distribution of subsidiary shares to a parent firm’s existing shareholders, which is 
often a nontaxable transaction” (p.7). As a result of this corporate separation, the child firm becomes 
an independent, publicly traded entity that no longer operates under the parent firm’s control. 
In the spin-off literature, there is massive empirical research examining this value creation process 
from the perspective of the divesting firm and its spun-off subsidiary (Ahn and Walker, 2007; Bennett 
and Feldman, 2017; Chemmanur, Krishnan, and Nandy, 2014; Emrick et al., 2017; Feldman, 2016a; 




Feldman, 2016b; Feldman, 2016c; Iturriaga and Cruz, 2008; Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; Lin, 2020; Ozbek, 
2020; Ozbek and Boyd, 2020; Semadeni and Cannella, 2011; Veld and Veld-Merkouova, 2004; Woolley, 
2017). Despite all this previous research, we believe that there has been no study in the context of the 
market performance of the child firm by looking at its board structure. Therefore, it is important to 
closely examine whether any specific characteristics of the board of directors will influence the market 
success of these recently independent companies. In this paper, we particularly explore whether the 
board independence and directors’ industry experience will make a significant impact on the change 
in market valuation of these spun-off subsidiaries.  
Many scholars have researched this spin-off phenomenon from different aspects. For example, 
Feldman (2016a) finds that “for spin-off firm managers, the alignment of incentive compensation with 
stock market performance improves” (p.2027) in the post-spin-off stage. Chemmanur and He (2016) 
argue that “spin-offs increase institutional investors' welfare by relaxing trading constraints” (p.54). 
Feldman (2016b) suggests that the CEO duality and average stock market returns of spin-offs are 
positively associated. Chai et al. (2018) find that the three-day announcement effect is positively 
correlated with the long-run stock performance of spin-offs. Although these studies have revealed 
various success parameters for spin-offs, there is still an important need for understanding how board 
structure may affect the market performance of spun-off subsidiaries, which is the purpose of this 
research. 
The board of directors holds a very critical responsibility for governing companies, which especially 
includes “overseeing all major strategic decisions” (Cannella, Jones, and Withers, 2015: 440). Board 
members (directors) have some important responsibilities: monitoring, assessing, and counseling 
(advising) executives (Hambrick, Misangyi, and Park, 2015) as well as providing resources necessary 
for the firm growth (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) and helping the firm secure external ties (Carpenter, 
Pollock, and Leary, 2003). Therefore, we can argue that the role of directors in establishing an effective 
governance mechanism for organizations is crucial. 
According to arguments of the agency theory, independent boards, which refers to having majority 
of directors coming from outside of the firm, is critical to an effective corporate governance since 
“outside directors can more capably monitor the CEO’s activities” (Joseph, Ocasio, McDonnell, 2014: 
1834). Establishing this sort of a mechanism in organizations is expected to result in maximizing 
shareholder value, which is the main logic of agency theory (Joseph et al., 2014). For example, Bradley 
and Chen (2015) have argued that independent boards act in the interests of shareholders and 
encourage managers toward risky actions. Liu et al. (2015) have found that the board independence 
and firm operating performance have a positive association. Lu and Wang (2015) have also examined 
the relationship between board independence and firm R&D investments and found a positive 
correlation. All these findings show that having independent directors on the board creates many 
positive effects on the firm performance.  
According to arguments of the resource dependence theory, directors with industry experience 
will be much more useful and essential in some contexts (Arthurs et al., 2009). Experienced directors 
will have a better and quicker understanding of specific situations, which also results in the reduction 
of information asymmetry within the board (Arthurs et al., 2009). These directors are also able to “gain 
access to scarce resources and information” (Boyd, 1990: 419) within a specific industry. For instance, 
Chen, Chang, and Hsu (2017) have found a positive relationship between directors’ industry experience 
and internationalization. Drobetz et al. (2018) have argued that outside directors with more industry 
experience and firm value are positively related. Field and Mkrtchyan (2017) have shown a positive 
relationship between directors’ acquisition experience and subsequent firm performance. All these 
empirical investigations emphasize how important experienced directors are to the organizational 
performance.  




Considering the critical role of both board characteristics, in this study we will examine how board 
independence and directors’ previous industry experience may affect the market performance of 
corporate spin-offs. Our first research question aims to investigate whether the board independence 
has any significant impact on the change in market valuation of the child firm. Our second research 
question examines whether experienced directors have any effect on this market performance. We 
also look at the interaction effect of directors’ industry experience and board ownership to see 
whether this effect can create any further significant impact in our empirical framework. Following 
previous arguments in the corporate governance literature, we suggest that boards’ structures have 
a significant influence on how to effectively govern the firm (Beckman et al., 2014; Haynes and Hillman, 
2010; Kor and Sunradamurthy, 2009; Krause, Withers, and Semadeni, 2017; Parker, 2008; Tuggle et al., 
2010; Tian, Haleblian, and Rajagopalan, 2011). In particular, board independence is considered “key to 
improving corporate governance” (Guthrie, Sokolowsky, and Wan, 2012: 1149) and directors’ 
experience is considered key to producing “more value-creating” (Jeganathan, Ghannam, and Bugeja, 
2020: 2) corporate activities. Thus, we argue that in the context of corporate spin-offs, both board 
characteristics will have a crucial role on the market success of spun-off subsidiaries. By empirically 
examining these two board characteristics, we aim to fill an important gap in further understanding 
market success parameters for corporate spin -offs from the perspective of board structures. 
According to the results of our empirical investigation, we indeed find evidence that both board 
independence and directors’ industry experience positively and significantly affect the change in 
market valuation of the child firm. All these findings are well-aligned with our theoretical arguments. 
We also find that the interaction of directors’ industry experience and board ownership has a stronger 
positive effect on this change in market value. This study contributes to the strategy literature in a 
couple unique ways. First, our findings show strong evidence for the importance of board structures 
in the context of corporate spin-offs. Second, our study further proves the validity of agency and 
resource dependence theories for spin-offs. Third, our model not only examines the direct effects of 
board characteristics, but also looks at the contingency effect of board ownership on the market 
performance of spin-offs as independent, stand-alone entities. Overall, by using 123 completed U.S. 
spin-offs in a 14-year long time frame extracted from the SDC Platinum database, we establish an 
empirical framework examining the connection between board structure and market valuation of 
spun-off subsidiaries.  
The organization of our paper is as follows. At first, we define corporate spin-offs and explain why 
some corporations prefer spinning off their subsidiaries/ divisions. Afterwards, we present our three 
hypotheses and offer evidence from the literature. Then, we have our methodology and results 
sections. At the end, we discuss our results and conclude our research findings. 
 
THE REASON FOR UNDERTAKING SPIN-OFFS 
 
Truong (2017) defines corporate spin-offs as the “creation of a new independent company from a 
subsidiary or division of the parent company” (p.55), which is also a tax-free transaction. Corporate 
spin-offs (Emrick et al., 2017), as a restructuring technique, aim to help “companies meet their growth 
and capital efficiency objectives” (p.54) so that they can “deliver substantial shareholder value” (p.55). 
According to Bennett and Feldman (2017), there are four main motivations why companies undertake 
spin-offs. 
First and foremost, firms may want to focus on their core business(es) via “reducing 
overdiversification” (Bennett and Feldman, 2017: 101). The optimization of business portfolio will 
enable value creation via better resource allocation so that the restructured companies can more 
efficiently respond to the demands of customers (Emrick et al., 2017).  Second, firms may have a desire 
and/or need to have direct access to capital markets (Bennett and Feldman, 2017). Following the spin-




off event, firms will “attain fair market value for their shares and then issue equity to raise capital” 
(Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999: 78). Third, firms may just want to get rid of unwanted (e.g. 
underperformed or declining) business units (Bennett and Feldman, 2017). Firms will also eliminate 
negative synergies (Miles and Rosenfeld, 1983) via removal of those business units. And fourth, firms 
may aim to better align the managers’ interests with shareholders’ interests (Bennett and Feldman, 
2017) so that the agency cost will be reduced. As a result of becoming a publicly traded entity, 
shareholders of the spun-off subsidiary can better monitor executives due to the availability of 
financial records such as securities (Lin, 2020). At the end, all these strategic motivations are expected 




According to the core argument of agency theory, the board of directors has a critical responsibility of 
monitoring executives so that the interests of owners/ shareholders and those of executives will not 
diverge from each other substantially (Tuggle et al., 2010). This way, the board plays a critical 
“protective” role on shareholders’ rights. In the literature, it has been argued that independent boards 
(a.k.a. outsider-dominated boards) “are thought to be better monitors” (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003: 
385). In addition, board members have another crucial responsibility while governing the firm, which 
is to provide the firm with resources, knowledge, and expertise due to their industry experience 
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Through their industry ties, they can also help the firm better establish its 
prestige and reputation (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). In our context, spun-off subsidiaries, as newly stand-
alone entities, are in serious need of a strong governance structure since they no longer have access 
to parental resources. So, it is very important to understand whether board independence and 
directors’ industry experience (as well as their interaction) will influence the child firm’s market 
performance. Our theoretical arguments and empirical examination aim to reveal some “key” board-




Independent directors are those “individuals not employed as officers of the company” (Duque-
Grisales et al., 2020: 294). Independent boards are “more effective in reducing agency cost and 
improving firm governance” (Balsmeier, Fleming, and Manso, 2017: 536) through an increased 
oversight on the management team. Fama and Jensen (1983) also argue that the role of independent 
boards is crucial for organizational success since they represent shareholders and safeguard their 
interests.  
As the agency theory argues, agents tend to be opportunistic and independent directors are those 
non-executive board members who are responsible for securing the value maximization of 
shareholders via effectively controlling agents (Zattoni and Cuomo, 2010). Independent boards’ 
responsibilities include “the control of firm performance, the monitoring of firm’s activities, the 
assessment of CEO behaviors, and so on” (Zattoni and Cuomo, 2010: 64). Independent boards are 
considered “expert monitors” since they bring “unbiased oversight of management” within 
organizations (Zattoni and Cuomo, 2010: 65). Thus, independent boards are strong indicators of the 
improved quality of corporate governance (Westphal and Graebner, 2010). 
Board independence is also critical to enhance the organizational legitimacy in the corporate world 
in addition to making corporate leaders more “trusted” (Westphal and Graebner, 2010). If the control 
role of board is established strongly via increasing the number of independent directors, top 
leadership teams within organizations will hold more effective decision-making processes leading to a 
better alignment of principals’ and agents’ interests (Ramdani and Witteloostuijn, 2010). 




Consequently, overall firm performance is expected to increase. For example, Liu et al. (2015) have 
shown that board independence has a positive effect on the firm operating performance. Lu and Wang 
(2015) have found that independent boards and firm R&D investments are positively related. Neville 
et al. (2019) have argued that board independence and corporate misconduct are negatively 
associated in general. Pham and Nguyen (2020) have also shown a positive relationship between 
board independence and firm performance measured by return on assets and return on equity. All 
these findings support the positive impact of independent boards on the organizational procedures 
and performance.   
As explained earlier, spun-off subsidiaries become independent entities following the corporate 
separation from the parent firm. From the perspective of top management teams in this context, 
being independent basically means running a “brand new” company via creating and utilizing up-to-
date practices and procedures. In other words, these executives of the spun-off subsidiary will need 
to focus on creating value for the shareholders while also applying new strategies without any 
“parental” support. This situation requires the board to objectively monitor and assess the top 
management team in addition to providing them with constant strategic guidance. Furthermore, the 
board needs to make sure that managerial opportunism (Noe and Rebello, 1996) will not take place so 
that the agency cost does not increase. In order to accomplish this “safeguarded” governance 
structure, the board needs to be independent so that directors can make objective decisions without 
hesitation. Therefore, we argue that board independence and market performance of the spun-off 
subsidiary are positively associated. 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between board independence and change in market 
valuation of corporate spin-offs. 
 
DIRECTORS’ INDUSTRY EXPERIENCE 
 
Directors with industry experience are very critical to the board success (Badu and Appiah, 2017). This 
experience is also considered a “valuable, rare, and hard-to-imitate resource” (Tian, Haleblian, and 
Rajagopalan, 2011: 733). As argued in the resource dependence theory, “an organization’s corporate 
strategic orientation is linked to opportunities that are available to access required resources” (Chen, 
Chang, and Hsu, 2017: 66). According to the resource dependence theorists, both human and social 
capital that the board possesses will have a direct influence on how directors govern organizational 
processes and support firm’s progress via their knowledge, information, skills, and network of 
corporate and social relationships (Chen et al. 2017; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Kor and Sundaramurthy, 
2009; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Tian, Haleblian, and Rajagopalan, 2011). 
Directors’ industry-specific experience is a vital component for firm performance since it provides 
the executive team with an incredible opportunity to facilitate “access to critical information and 
valued resources” (Chen et al., 2017: 66). Basically, with the existence of appropriate resources that 
board members provide, the firm will be in a much better shape while running and improving its 
operations. The industry ties of board members will also enable the firm to establish legitimacy among 
its rivals since these directors have a much better understanding of the industry conditions and related 
competitive dynamics (Chen et al., 2017; Kor and Misangyi, 2008). For instance, Kor and 
Sundaramurthy (2009) have found that directors’ industry ties and experience are positively 
associated with the firm’s rate of sales growth. Chen et al. (2017) have suggested that there is a 
positive relationship between directors’ international experience and internationalization. Field and 
Mkrtchyan (2017) have found that directors’ previous acquisition experience positively influences 
subsequent acquisition performance. Fernandez and Sundaramurthy (2020) have also found that 
boards’ regional international experience has a positive effect on the cross-border M&A performance. 




Thus, we can argue that board members’ industry experience has important impacts on firm 
performance and related decision-making processes. 
Spun-off subsidiaries, as stand-alone entities, are fully responsible for establishing their competitive 
posture (Ginsberg and Venkatraman, 1992) in the industry without any “parental” resources. In order 
to effectively compete with their industry rivals, these firms will need to have access to industry-
related knowledge, information, and other valued resources. Directors who possess these sorts of 
critical resources will benefit these firms significantly since they are going to serve as “strategic 
connectors” with the industry. If this connection is strong, the spun-off subsidiary will show the 
market that it can survive and compete on its own, which also helps to increase organizational 
reputation (Deephouse and Carter, 2005). Therefore, we argue that directors’ industry experience and 
market performance of the spun-off subsidiary are positively associated. 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between directors’ industry experience and change in 
market valuation of corporate spin-offs. 
 
AN INTERACTION ANALYSIS 
 
In this analysis, we have looked at the potential contingency effect of board ownership on the 
relationship between directors’ industry experience and the change in market valuation of spun-off 
subsidiaries. As explained in the theory development section, directors’ industry experience is 
necessary for effective decision-making process, which also makes the board more competent in 
governing the firm (Gaur et al., 2015). Gaining access to crucial resources and better analyzing the 
external environment via board members’ industry-specific experience is a “key” success factor for 
firm performance (Gaur et al., 2015). Board ownership also plays a vital role in corporate governance 
since it is considered an important incentive mechanism for “effective monitoring and oversight of 
important corporate decisions” (Bhagat and Bolton, 2013: 110). In addition, board ownership tends to 
make directors pay more attention to their corporate duties (Booth, Cornett, and Tehranian, 2002). 
Thus, we expect that having directors with industry-specific experience on the board who also own 
shares in the company will create a stronger positive effect on the market performance of the spun-
off subsidiary. In other words, board ownership will have a moderating effect on this relationship. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Board ownership positively moderates the relationship between directors’ industry 






Our sample consisted of all completed U.S. spin-offs for a 14-year long (2000-2014) time period. We 
used SDC Platinum to identify these spin-off events. We only included spin-offs in which 100 percent 
of outstanding shares were distributed to the shareholders of the parent company in order to ensure 
the consistency. We also made sure to double-check the accuracy of these spin-off events on some 
online resources including The Wall Street Journal and Lexis/Nexis. This double-checking mechanism 
is proved to be very important since we need to only include corporate spin-offs in our sample, not 
other sorts of divestitures such as split-offs, sell-offs, or equity carve-outs. Our initial sample yielded 
205 completed spin-offs. Due to missing data, we had a final sample of 123 spin-off events. We used a 
combination of two sets of data. The governance data was extracted from the U.S. Securities and 




Exchange Commission website. This data was hand-collected from the DEF 14-A (proxy) statements of 




Our study included two predictors, which were board independence and directors’ industry 
experience. We also controlled for some other variables, which enabled us to parcel out their potential 
effects on this model. We tested the change in market valuation of spun-off subsidiaries within two 
years following the spin-off execution date. Figure 1 provides our conceptual framework, including 
empirically tested results of all variables. 
We used the weighted least square (WLS) regression to test all models in this study. According to 
Hayes and Cai (2007), “WLS regression allows the investigator to weight each case differently in the 
derivation of the sum of squared residuals” (p. 711). The WLS regression is an effective estimating 
method since it takes care of the of heteroscedasticity problem (Walsh, 1987). Sterchi and Wolf (2017) 
also argue compared to the ordinary least squared (OLS) regression, the WLS regression can yield 
higher efficiency gains. Following Aiken and West (1991), both of our models (full and contingency) 
can be expressed as follows: 
 
The change in market valuation of spun-off subsidiaries (full model) = β₀ + β₁ Board independence + β₂ 
Directors’ industry experience + є₁ 
 
The change in market valuation of spun-off subsidiaries (contingency model) = β’₀ + β’₁ Board 







The two-year percent change in market value of equity (MVE) of the spun-off subsidiary following the 
corporate separation is chosen as our dependent variable in this study. Consistent with previous 
studies (Subramanyam and Venkatachalam, 2007), we measured MVE by “as the fiscal year-end price 
per share multiplied by shares outstanding” (p.465). MVE is “a measure of economic performance” 
(Hirschey, 1985: 97) of the firm and can be considered “the risk-adjusted present value of all future 
profits” (Hirschey, 1985: 92). Following arguments in the literature (Core and Guay, 1999), we also 




In this study, board independence and directors’ industry experience are our two explanatory 
variables. Board independence is measured by “the ratio of outside directors to total number of 
directors on the board” (Gani and Jermias, 2006: 302). Directors’ industry experience is measured by 
“the percentage fraction of outside directors on the board that possess industry experience” (Drobetz 











We controlled for several variables that could have potentially affected our outcome variable. Firm 
leverage was measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets (D’Mello and Farhat, 2008). Firm size 
was measured by the logarithm of number of employees (Angelini and Generale, 2008). Firm capital 
intensity was measured by the ratio of total capital expenditures to total sales (Silva-Gao, 2012). 
Industry R&D (advertising) intensity was measured by the average ratio of industry R&D (advertising) 
expenditures to industry total sales for all firms with the same three-digit Standard Industry 
Classification (SIC) code over a five-year period prior to the spin-off event (King, Slotegraaf, and 
Kesner, 2008; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013). Year dummy indicates whether the spin-off has occurred 
during a financial crisis such as 2001-02 and 2008-09. For those spin-offs that took place in either 
period, we coded them as 1 and all others were coded 0. Industry dummy indicates whether the spun-
off subsidiary is a part of either the manufacturing or service industry. Manufacturing firms were coded 
1 and service firms were coded 0. Board size was measured by the total number of directors on the 
board. (Carpenter, Pollock, and Leary, 2003). CEO origin indicates whether the spun-off subsidiary’s 
CEO has previously worked in the management team of parent firm, which refers to being an “insider” 
(Wruck and Wruck, 2002). If the CEO was an “insider”, CEO origin was coded 1; if not, it was coded 0. 
CEO duality was coded 1 if the CEO and Chairperson were the same person; if not, it was coded 0 
(Jensen and Zajac, 2004). Managerial ownership was measured by the percentage of equity owned by 
top managers (Alessandri and Seth, 2014). And finally, board ownership was measured by the 




Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations including the levels of significance for all 
variables. As seen in this table, the mean board independence is 0.757, which shows that almost 76% 
of directors on the board are independent. The mean industry experience of directors is 0.459, which 
shows that almost 46% of directors have experience in the same industry. The mean board ownership 
is also 8.35%. The variance inflation factor (VIF) test shows an average of 1.49, which indicates that 
there is no multicollinearity issue in this study (Barako and Brown, 2008). In addition, almost all 
variables have a VIF value less than 2. 
Table 2 presents the results of our WLS regression, assessing the effect of board independence and 
directors’ industry experience on the change in market value of corporate spin-offs. More specifically, 
this table shows values for unstandardized beta coefficients and standard errors along with levels of 
significance of these coefficients. All four models are developed in a hierarchical manner, including 
independent variables and interaction variable one at a time. Model 1 only includes control variables. 
Model 2 and 3 include independent variables, which makes Model 3 our full model. Model 4 includes 
interaction variable. 
Hypotheses 1 predicts that there is a positive relationship between board independence and change 
in market valuation of spun-off subsidiary. The coefficient for board independence was positive and 
significant (b = 3.190; p < 0.05), which provided supported for H1. Hypotheses 2 predicts that there is 
also a positive relationship between directors’ industry experience and change in market valuation of 
spun-off subsidiary. The coefficient for directors’ industry experience was positive and significant (b = 
1.480; p < 0.05), which provided supported for H2. Regarding our interaction analysis, Hypotheses 3 
predicts that board ownership positively moderates the relationship between directors’ industry 
experience and change in market valuation of spun-off subsidiary. The coefficient for interaction 
variable was positive and significant (b = 0.905; p < 0.05), which provided supported for H3. In Figure 
2, we plotted two-way interaction effect in order to gain a clearer insight into this contingency 




relationship. This figure suggests that the positive effect of directors’ industry experience is greater 
on the change in market value when there is a high level of board ownership. Thus, all hypotheses in 
this study are strongly supported. 
 
Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations Among Study’s Variables 
VARIABLES Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Change in 
Market Value 
(ln) 
0.135 0.954 1.000                            
2. Leverage 0.245 0.233  -0.028 1.000              
3. Firm Size 
(Ln) 0.649  2.103  0.047 
0.173 
** 1.000             
4. Capital 
Intensity 0.627  1.762  -0.123 -0.024 -0.286 1.000            
5. Industry 








0.011  0.016  0.012 0.095 0.072 -0.060 0.035 1.000          
7. Year 










*** 1.000         
8. Industry 
Dummy 0.473  0.500  0.026 
-0.185 




** -0.067 1.000        








*** 1.000       
10. Ceo 
Origin 0.809 0.393 -0.062 0.041 
0.287 
*** -0.042 -0.061 0.038 0.112 0.011 
0.124 
* 1.000      
11. CEO 
Duality 0.390 0.488 0.078 -0.004 0.032 -0.110 -0.040 -0.094 -0.014 0.002 
-0.163 




0.042 0.098  -0.020 -0.090 -0.177 ** -0.025 -0.048 0.054 0.080 -0.014 -0.036 0.057 0.067 1.000    
13. Board 
Ownership 0.083 0.151 0.023 -0.055 
-0.227 
*** 0.007 -0.076 -0.011 0.052 
-0.116 
* -0.041 0.048 -0.078 
0.668 
*** 1.000   
14. Board 
Independence 0.757 0.111  0.053 0.078 0.097 0.009 
0.182 




* -0.054 0.030 
-0.169 


















*** -0.061 1.000 










Table 2. Independent Models of Board Independence and Directors’ Industry Experience (Robust 
Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
DV: Change in market 





Control Variables  





























































































Explanatory Variables  











Interaction Variable  
Directors’ Industry 
Experience X Board 
Ownership 
--- --- --- 0.905** (0.420) 
Sample Size 123 123 123 123 
R-squared 0.227 0.279 0.326 0.346 








DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
This study proposes a unique framework on the board independence, directors’ industry experience, 
and spun-off subsidiaries’ market performance. Our arguments were based on two well-established 
theories in the field of management, namely the agency theory and resource dependence theory. Both 
of our hypotheses suggested a positive effect of board independence and directors’ industry 
experience on the change in market valuation of spun-off subsidiary. Our interaction analysis also 
expected a positive moderating effect of board ownership on the relationship between directors’ 
industry experience and market performance of the spun-off subsidiary. Our findings support all these 
arguments. 
Our findings help better understand how some board-related governance mechanisms affect the 
market performance of spun-off subsidiaries. In the literature, it has been widely argued that board 
independence and directors’ industry experience have important implications on the firm 
performance. Koerniadi and Tourani-Rad (2012) have found that board independence in New Zealand 
has a negative and significant effect on the firm value measured by return on assets and return on 
equity. On the opposite side, Sun, Lan, and Ma (2014) have found that board independence is positively 
and significantly associated with return on assets and stock returns of the firm. According to our 
results, board independence positively and significantly influences the market performance of spun-
off subsidiary. This means that board members’ objective assessment of top management teams via 
independence is a “key” success component in the context of governing corporate spin-offs. 
Regarding directors’ industry experience, Von Meyerinck, Oesch, and Schmid (2016) have found that 
appointments of industry-experienced directors lead to higher announcement returns compared to 
those without industry-specific experience. Volonté and Gantenbein (2016) have looked at the impacts 
of international experience and industry/ financial know-how of directors in Switzerland on the firm 
performance measured by Tobin Q. They have found that there is a positive and significant relationship 
between directors’ international experience and firm performance whereas there is a negative and 
significant relationship between directors’ industry/ financial know-how and firm performance 
(Volonté and Gantenbein, 2016). In the context of corporate spin-offs, our results reveal that directors’ 
industry experience and market performance of spun-off subsidiary is positively and significantly 
related. This tells us that directors’ industry knowledge, ties, and connections to related resources will 
be very critical to the market success of spun-off subsidiary. 
The contingency framework in this study has examined whether the interaction of directors’ 
industry experience and board ownership will affect the market performance of spun-off subsidiary. 
Indeed, we have found a significant and positive relationship here. This finding is very important in the 
sense that it tells us more about the importance of board ownership in governing recently 
independent companies. In the literature, board ownership is considered an important incentive 
mechanism since “stock ownership by board members gives them an incentive to monitor managers 
more carefully and thus help resolve agency conflicts between managers and shareholders” (Karim, 
van Zijl, and Mollah, 2013: 158). Zona (2015) has argued that board ownership influences board 
processes in family firms. According to the results of our interaction effect, we can argue that if board 
members own stock, they will be more effectively using their industry-specific experience (e.g. 
utilizing their ties and access to valuable resources much better) while governing the spun-off 
subsidiary. This finding is important since it reiterates the “vital” role of board ownership for the firm’s 
market performance. 
For practitioners, our empirical findings provide some important hints on how to constitute an 
effective board for spun-off subsidiaries. By remembering the fact that these subsidiaries do no longer 
have access to parental resources and they have a “brand new” top management team, the board’s 
role will be critical to the firm survival. As our results suggest, constituting a board with many 




independent directors as well as having directors with industry-specific experience will help the spun-
off subsidiary increase its market performance. As results of our interaction analysis show, offering 
board members stocks in the spun-off subsidiary will further enable/ motivate them to use their 
industry knowledge, resources, and ties for the sake of firm’s market performance. Thus, our findings 
reiterate the important role of board of directors on firm performance and identify a critical 
contingency relationship in this context. 
Although this study contributes to the strategy and governance literatures in many ways (as 
explained above), it also comes with some limitations, which should be addressed by future research. 
This study covers a 14-year of time span, which can be extended in future studies. Our sample only 
includes U.S. corporate spin-offs. Future research can look at whether our findings will hold true in 
some other countries. Our dependent variable is the change in market valuation of spun-off subsidiary. 
Future empirical work can use some other profitability measures as a dependent variable. And finally, 
we use board ownership as a moderating variable. Future studies may examine some other 
contingency effects on the market success of spun-off subsidiaries.  
In conclusion, this study uses a unique framework explaining why and how board independence 
and directors’ industry experience affect the market performance of corporate spin-offs in addition to 
offering a contingency analysis. Our findings confirm the very role of board of directors in governing 
spun-off subsidiaries as independent, stand-alone entities. We truly hope that our arguments based 
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Figure 1. Theoretical Model Including the Level of Significance of Results 
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Figure 2. The Interaction Effect of Directors’ Industry Experience and Board Ownership on the 
Change in Market Valuation of Spun-Off Subsidiary 
